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On July 3, 1989, the Supreme Court ended months of intense specu-
lation by handing down Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.' In
this decision, the Court curtailed the right to terminate a pregnancy but
stopped short of reversing its historic Roe v. Wade2 ruling. Webster was
undoubtedly one of the most highly publicized and controversial rulings
of the century. From the time the Court agreed to hear the case, abortion
opponents and supporters alike engaged in an anguished and bitter effort
to capture public opinion and to influence the Supreme Court itself.
Given the intense level of anticipation while awaiting Webster, it was not
surprising that the reactions to the decision were swift, emotional, and
predictable. The immediate responses ran the gamut from jubilant claims
that the decision marked the first step toward a complete reversal of Roe
v. Wade to angry accusations that it undermined the right to abortion
and endangered the autonomy of women. The purpose of this Article is to
trace the development of the Court's abortion doctrine from its original
opinion to its most recent. Since the Roe decision was the benchmark for
all subsequent abortion rulings, I will begin with a brief overview of its
framework.
I. THE Roe FRAMEWORK
In its famous Roe v. Wade abortion ruling over sixteen years ago, the
Supreme Court declared that a woman's constitutional right to privacy
was broad enough to include the decision to terminate her pregnancy.
This right to abortion was a qualified right which had to be balanced
against competing state interests.3 In the matter of abortion, the state
could have only two legitimate interests: maternal health and fetal life. In
order to define the scope and limits of state regulation of these two inter-
t This article is republished in substantial part from No. 102/103 LAW & JUSTICE 6 (1989).
109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 154.
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ests, the Court set up guidelines that established different standards for
the different stages of pregnancy.
During the first trimester, when abortion was safer than childbirth,
the state could not show any interest compelling enough to impose any
restrictions on abortion. The decision belonged solely to the woman and
her physician. From the end of the first trimester until viability, the state
could regulate abortion, but only with an eye to maternal health. Here,
the Court assumed that after the twelfth week of pregnancy abortion
posed a greater risk to maternal health than did childbirth. At viability,
the fetus acquired the "capability of meaningful life"" outside the womb.
Then the state's interest in protecting fetal life became compelling
enough for the state to regulate or even ban abortion, "except when...
necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother."" In Doe v. Bolton,6
a companion case to Roe, the Court declared that what the health of the
mother meant in any particular case was a medical judgment to be
exercised in the light of all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, fa-
milial, and the woman's age-relevant to the well-being of the patient. All
these factors may relate to health. This allows the attending physician the
room he needs to make his best medical judgment. And it is room that oper-
ates for the benefit, not the disadvantage, of the pregnant woman.7
The Roe decision invalidated the existing abortion legislation of vir-
tually every state in the nation. Due to the sweeping nature of the ruling
on such a deeply disputed issue, it was inevitable that the abortion con-
troversy would continue to rage. However, friends and foes of the ruling
did more than debate the implications of the Court's conclusions.
Through a continuous series of legislative struggles, they strove to enact
revised abortion statutes either to expand or to restrict the impact of the
Roe decision. As a result, a host of lower court battles was spawned. The
Supreme Court itself remained at the center of the ongoing debate. Re-
peatedly, it chose to interpret the scope of its original decision and to
settle issues it had not anticipated, left ambiguous, or deliberately
shelved.
For the sake of convenience, I will group the Court's abortion devel-
opments after Roe in the following categories: consent and notice require-
ments, restrictions on public funding, and standard of care regulations. I
will conclude with a brief analysis of the Webster decision and add my
own reflections on the abortion issues that will continue to occupy our
attention for the immediate future.
Id. at 163.
' Id. at 164.
o 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
7 Id. at 192.
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II. CONSENT AND NOTIFICATION DECISIONS
A. Parental Consent and Notification
The consent issue first surfaced in Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth,' handed down in 1976. Danforth involved a Mis-
souri abortion statute stipulating that a woman, unmarried and under
eighteen years of age, must get the written consent of one parent or per-
son in loco parentis before she could obtain an abortion. The provision
was qualified by the clause, "unless the abortion is certified by a licensed
physician to be necessary in order to preserve the life of the mother."
Relying on its conclusion from Roe, the Court invalidated the Missouri
parental consent provision by a six-to-three majority.
While it held that a woman's right to abortion was not absolute, the
Roe majority also insisted that her abortion choice was immune from gov-
ernment regulation during the first trimester. Writing for the majority in
Danforth, Justice Blackmun argued that if the state itself could not inter-
fere with a woman's choice, it could not delegate that power to a third
party. The Court freely acknowledged that the state has a more legiti-
mate concern in regulating the activities of minors than of adults. How-
ever, this interest was not compelling enough to override the minor's right
to privacy by allowing a parental veto of her abortion decision. The Court
hastened to add that its ruling referred to "blanket" provisions only. It
was not suggesting that every minor, regardless of age or level of matur-
ity, was capable of giving informed consent for terminating her
pregnancy."°
The Supreme Court confronted parental consent once again in Bel-
lotti v. Baird II." This case grew out of a challenge to a Massachusetts
statute that required an unmarried, pregnant minor to obtain the consent
of both her parents for an abortion. If one or both parents refused per-
mission, a judge of the Superior Court could authorize the abortion "for a
good cause.' 2 Justice Powell wrote the opinion. He narrowed the Court's
task to determining whether or not the statute allowed for parental notice
and consent in a way that did not unduly burden the right to seek an
abortion. Even within this limited perspective, Justice Powell found two
fatal flaws in the Massachusetts abortion provision. First, by requiring a
minor to notify her parents before going to court, the regulation unduly
burdened the adolescent's initial access to the courts. The majority in-
- 428 U.S. 52 (1976). For a discussion of the Danforth case, see Canavan, The Theory of the
Danforth Case, No. 58/59 LAW & JUSTICE 99-109 (1978).
9 Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.020(3), (4) (1974).
10 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-75.
443 U.S. 622 (1979).
" MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12S (Law. Co-op. 1977).
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sisted that every minor must be completely free from parental interfer-
ence in her efforts to persuade a judge either that she is mature enough to
make her own decision or that, despite her immaturity, an abortion is in
her best interest. Second, Justice Powell believed that the statute gave
judges too much leeway in overruling a mature minor's decision to termi-
nate her pregnancy. If a mature adolescent is fully competent to decide, a
judge may not veto her decision.' 3
Parental consent was also at issue in Akron v. Akron Center for Re-
productive Health, Inc.'4 At stake was a provision of an Akron city ordi-
nance banning abortions for an unmarried minor under the age of fifteen
unless she could secure a court order or the written permission of a par-
ent or legal guardian. 6 Writing again for the six-to-three majority, Justice
Powell struck down the provision on the grounds that it was a "blanket"
provision similar to the Missouri statute invalidated in Danforth. The
state may not declare that all adolescents are too immature to make their
own decisions. Rather, the government must provide some alternative
whereby the pregnant minor may show that she is mature enough to
make such a decision, or that, in spite of her immaturity, an abortion
would be in her best interest.'6
Although the Court invalidated all the parental consent require-
ments, it left open the possibility that the state may demand some kind
of parental notification or consultation when an immature minor seeks to
end her pregnancy. In H.L. v. Matheson,' the Court addressed the issue
of parental notification. The case resulted from a challenge to a Utah
abortion statute by a fifteen-year-old unmarried girl living with her par-
ents and relying on them for support. The Utah regulation required that
a physician notify, if possible, the parents or guardian of a minor wanting
to terminate her pregnancy. 8 The Chief Justice at that time, Warren
Burger, authored the six-to-three majority opinion. The majority upheld
the Utah provision for parental notice because it did not violate an imma-
ture and dependent minor's freedom of choice. Since neither parents nor
judges had a veto power over the minor's decision, the notice requirement
did not unduly burden her right to an abortion. Moreover, the Chief Jus-
tice argued that the state need not fashion its abortion regulations so as
to encourage or facilitate abortion. On the contrary, encouraging child-
birth is a legitimate expression of the state's interest in protecting poten-
"' Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 640-50.
1 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
" AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870, § 1870.05(B) (1978).
16 Akron, 462 U.S. at 439-40.
17 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
," UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304(2) (1978).
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tial life. 9
B. Spousal Consent
The same Missouri statute that mandated parental consent also re-
quired the written permission of the husband for first trimester abor-
tions.2" This provision failed the constitutional challenge for the same
reason that parental consent failed. The state could not delegate power to
another that it did not have. The Court brushed aside the argument that
the law was justified by concern for the marriage relationship. It did not
believe that a marriage would be strengthened "by giving the husband a
veto power exercisable for any reason whatsoever or for no reason at
all."'21 Ideally, both husband and wife should concur in the abortion deci-
sion. However, when they disagree, the woman's decison should prevail
since she physically carries the child and is more directly affected by the
pregnancy. 22
C. Informed Consent
In Danforth, the Court upheld a Missouri provision that required a
pregnant woman to give written, informed consent prior to obtaining an
abortion. However, the Court did not address the issue of what kind of
information might be provided to ensure that her consent be truly in-
formed. The Court addressed that question in its Akron decision. At
stake was an Akron city ordinance designed to ensure that pregnant
women were fully aware of what they were doing when they decided to
terminate their pregnancies. The ordinance required the attending physi-
cian to inform the pregnant woman about a number of specific issues,
including the status of her pregnancy, the potential risks and complica-
tions associated with. abortion in general, the special risks involved in her
own pregnancy in particular, the technique to be used, and the character-
istics, development, and humanity of her unborn child from the moment
of conception. In addition, the woman had to wait twenty-four hours from
the time she signed the consent form to the time she obtained the
abortion.21
The Court's six-to-three majority agreed that informed consent re-
Matheson, 398 U.S. at 411-13. Legally, "emancipated" minors are those who are married,
self-supporting, or independent of their parents in other ways. "Mature" minors are those
whom the law regards as capable of making informed decisions about their own health and
welfare.
20 Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.020(3) (1974).
"2 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71.
22 Id. at 69-71.
1' AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870, § 1870.06(B), (C) (1978).
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quirements embodied a legitimate state interest in maternal health. How-
ever, the majority found the Akron ordinance to be invalid because it
went far beyond what was necessary for informed consent. The state's
concern for the mother would not justify abortion regulations designed to
influence the woman's informed choice between abortion and childbirth.
The Akron provisions did just that. They were not designed to inform the
woman's consent but rather to persuade her not to consent at all. More-
over, the requirement that a woman be told that her unborn child is
human from the moment of conception was contrary to Roe because it
reflected "one theory of when life begins to justify its regulation of abor-
tions."2 4 The Court found "an additional and equally decisive" objection
to the provision in that it infringed on the discretion of the pregnant wo-
man's physician. By demanding a long and rigid catalogue of information,
the Akron regulations placed the physician in an "undesired and uncom-
fortable straitjacket." '25
The Court also struck down the provision requiring that the attend-
ing physician personally inform the woman of the particular risks of her
pregnancy. While admitting that such information was clearly related to
the state's legitimate interest in maternal health, Justice Powell neverthe-
less invalidated this regulation because the disclosures had to be made by
the attending physician. The state's concern was limited to ensuring that
a woman's consent was free and informed. Any qualified person other
than the attending physician could furnish the necessary information.26
The twenty-four hour waiting period suffered the same fate. The reg-
ulation was intended to provide the mother with an opportunity to reflect
on the information she received before making her final decision. The
Court invalidated the "arbitrary and inflexible" delay on grounds that it
did not serve any legitimate state interest in promoting informed consent
or safer abortions. In addition, Justice Powell noted that the waiting pe-
riod would add to the cost of an abortion "by requiring the woman to
make two separate trips to the abortion facility. 21 7
III. ABORTION FUNDING CASES
Although the Roe Court listed poverty among the factors that com-
plicate the abortion problem, it was not until 1977 that the question of
24 Akron, 462 U.S. at 444.
25 Id. at 445 (citing Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67 n.8).
" Id. at 448-49.
Id. at 450. In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747 (1986), decided three years after Akron, the Court also invalidated the informed
consent provisions of Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act. I have not commented on that
aspect of Thornburgh here because the act's informed consent requirements were similar to
Akron's, and the Court used the Akron rationale to strike them down.
FROM Roe TO Webster
public funding of abortions for the indigent came squarely before the
Court. Since the Medicaid program was involved in the Beal v. Doe and
Maher v. Roe decisions, a brief background of Medicaid will be helpful in
clarifying the underlying issues.
A. Medicaid
Title XIX of the Social Security Act" established the Medicaid pro-
gram which enabled the states to provide federally funded medical assis-
tance to the poor.2 9 While the program is not mandatory, all participating
states must fulfill certain conditions. For the purposes of Title XIX, the
indigent are divided into two classes: the "categorically needy" and the
"medically needy." The categorical group includes needy persons with de-
pendent children, the aged, the blind, and the disabled. Medical coverage
must be extended to all persons in this classification. The "medically
needy" embraces all other disadvantaged persons. Medical attention may
be given to this latter group at the discretion of the states, provided that
reasonable standards are used to determine what kind of coverage is ade-
quate under the objectives of Title XIX3
B. Beal v. Doe3
The Beal case resulted from a class action challenge to Pennsylva-
nia's Medicaid program which funded only medically necessary abor-
tions. " Eligible for Medicaid but denied reimbursement for elective abor-
tions, several indigent women maintained that the Pennsylvania
regulations conflicted with the provisions of Title XIX. Justice Powell,
who wrote for the six-to-three majority, ruled that Title XIX did not re-
quire the states to fund nontherapeutic abortions as a condition for par-
ticipating in Medicaid. As long as the norms for determining the standard
of care were reasonable and consistent with the objective of the Act, they
did not violate Title XIX. According to the majority, the Pennsylvania
regulations were in conformity with the Act's goal of providing assistance
to low income persons who could not afford needed medical care. Here
the Court implicitly distinguished between therapeutic and nontherapeu-
tic abortions and labeled the latter as unnecessary medical services. Thus,
Justice Powell could conclude that it was not contrary to "the objectives
of the Act for a State to refuse to fund unnecessary-though perhaps
28 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 - 1397 (1982).
, Id. § 1396(a).
30 Id. § 1396(a)(10)(C).
, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
32 3 Pa. Bull. 2207, 2209 (September 29, 1973).
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desirable-medical services." 33
The Court went on to reject on both economic and health grounds
the litigant's argument that the exclusion of nontherapeutic abortions
from medical coverage was unreasonable. Justice Powell insisted that the
Roe decision had granted the state a valid and important interest in fos-
tering childbirth throughout the entire gestation period. He could not
find anything in the language or legislative history of Title XIX which
suggested that normal childbirth was unreasonable or was in conflict with
Medicaid.3 4
C. Maher v. Roe35
The Maher litigation involved a Connecticut Welfare Department
regulation requiring documented medical evidence indicating that an
abortion was medically necessary before a woman could be reimbursed.3 6
Unable to obtain the necessary medical certificate, two indigent, pregnant
women challenged the regulation on the grounds that it was inconsistent
with the requirements of Title XIX and that it violated their equal pro-
tection rights. Regarding equal protection, the plaintiffs argued that the
Connecticut regulation violated their equal protection guarantees by pro-
viding financial assistance for childbirth but denying it for abortion.
Thus, the regulation set up a "suspect class," distinguishing between two
different categories of pregnant women-those wanting an abortion and
those wanting to bear a child. Furthermore, they contended that the reg-
ulation interfered with their fundamental right to reject childbirth and to
choose abortion by agreeing to pay for the one but not for the other.37
Since it had already ruled in Beal that states do not have to fund medi-
cally unnecessary abortions, the Court had only to decide whether Con-
necticut created a suspect class or interfered with a fundamental right.
Justice Powell wrote the narrow five-to-four majority opinion. He re-
called that the Court has developed two clearly defined standards of re-
view in its application of the equal protection doctrine: strict scrutiny and
the minimum scrutiny or rational basis test. The Court has always de-
manded strict scrutiny when the legislation creates a suspect class or
when it infringes on a fundamental right. In both these instances, the
state must justify why it set up the class or regulated the right by proving
that its interest is compelling. Where neither such a class nor such a right
is at stake, the rational basis test, the less rigorous standard of review, is
13 Beal, 432 U.S. at 444-45.
34 Id. at 445-46.
35 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
'6 CONNECTICUT WELFARE DEPARTMENT, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM MANUAL, vol. 3, ch. III,
§ 275 (1975).
37 Maher, 432 U.S. at 470.
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applied. It merely requires that legislation bear a "reasonable relation" to
a valid state interest.38
The Court upheld the Connecticut regulation, declaring that it
neither created a suspect class nor violated a fundamental right. The fact
that Connecticut favored childbirth over abortion did not establish poor
pregnant women as a suspect class. For the purposes of equal protection
analysis, Justice Powell argued, the Court "has never held that financial
need alone identifies a suspect class."39 Regarding fundamental rights, the
Court distinguished between the existence of a right and its exercise at
public expense. Justice Powell reaffirmed the fundamental right to abor-
tion established in Roe but denied that the government must pay for its
exercise. The Department of Welfare regulations did not curtail the right
of indigent pregnant women to terminate their pregnancies. While Con-
necticut may have influenced such women's decisions by making child-
birth a more attractive alternative, "it has imposed no restriction on ac-
cess to abortions that was not already there." '
Since the Connecticut regulation did not create a suspect class or in-
terfere directly with a fundamental right, there was no need to apply the
compelling state interest test to the legislation. It was enough to show
that the preference for childbirth over elective abortions was "reasonably
related" to a genuine state concern. That was not difficult to do. Roe's
recognition of the state's strong interest in protecting the potentiality of
the fetus4 1 and Beal's awareness of the state's "strong and legitimate in-
terest in encouraging normal childbirth" '42 provided enough justification
for the state to pay for childbirth but to deny assistance for abortion.
While expressing sympathy for the plight of poor women seeking abor-
tions, the majority opinion insisted that it was not the business of the
Court to provide solutions for every financial or social problem. That task
belongs to Congress.'
D. Harris v. McRae"'
Unlike the Beal-Maher litigations which involved state Medicaid reg-
ulations, the Harris v. McRae decision dealt with a congressional effort to
restrict Medicaid benefits for most therapeutic abortions as well as for all
" Id. at 470. (citing San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)). For a
good discussion of this topic, see Silverstein, Benefits for Conscientious Objectors?, 19 CATH.
LAW. 62 (1973).
" Maher, 432 U.S. at 471-72.
40 Id. at 474.
" Roe, v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
42 Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977).
43 Maher, 432 U.S. at 479-80.
44 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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elective ones. The federal funding limitation was commonly known as the
"Hyde Amendment." The version of the amendment that was in force
when the McRae litigation reached the Supreme Court denied funds for
abortions except when the life of the mother would be endangered by
continuing the pregnancy or when the pregnancy resulted from rape or
incest."" A class-action suit was brought to challenge the amendment. The
plaintiffs argued that the federal Medicaid program must require partici-
pating states to fund "medically necessary" abortions. They also con-
tended that the amendment infringed on their guarantees of due process
and equal protection by refusing to reimburse the state for all medically
necessary abortions while funding the expenses associated with
childbirth.4
6
The Court let the Hyde Amendment stand. Writing for a five-to-four
majority, Justice Stewart noted that the Medicaid program was rooted in
the shared financial contribution of both the federal government and the
participating state. However, he insisted that the federal government
never meant to coerce a state into providing any health services that Con-
gress itself refused to fund. What was true of health services in general
was true of abortion in particular. Hence, the Court concluded that a par-
ticipating state has no obligation "to pay for those medically necessary
abortions for which federal reimbursement is unavailable under the Hyde
Amendment."' 7
The Court also rejected the claim that the Hyde Amendment unduly
restricted the woman's liberty of choice guaranteed by Roe. Citing Maher,
Justice Stewart argued that the Roe decision did not prevent a state from
preferring childbirth to abortion and supporting that preference with
public funds. However, the litigants argued that their case was different
from Maher. Whereas Maher involved a refusal to fund nontherapeutic
abortions, the Hyde Amendment denied reimbursement for many medi-
cally necessary abortions. By not paying for a therapeutic abortion, the
amendment could endanger a woman's health and thus violate her consti-
tutional rights. Justice Stewart acknowledged the difference between Mc-
Rae and Maher. However, he brushed aside the idea that the amendment
infringed upon the woman's freedom of choice recognized in Roe. In his
view, there was a difference between immunity and entitlement. Recogni-
tion of an immunity from state interference with the right to abortion did
not automatically create an entitlement to government funding for termi-
nating a pregnancy. 8
. The equal protection argument in McRae failed for the same reason
" Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1979).
46 McRae, 448 U.S. at 304-05.
" Id. at 311.
4 Id. at 316-18.
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that it did in Maher. As noted above, the Maher Court reasoned that a
regulation funding childbirth but not abortions did not discriminate
against a suspect class. On this issue, Justice Stewart found McRae and
Maher to be identical. Thus he concluded that the Hyde Amendment was
"not predicated on a constitutionally suspect classification."4 Rather, by
providing incentives for childbirth, the amendment was reasonably re-
lated to a valid government interest in protecting potential life.50
IV. STANDARD OF CARE REGULATIONS
The dissenting justices interpreted the abortion funding cases as a
retreat from the doctrine of Roe. By focusing its interest on potential life,
they argued, the state neglected the mother's health and restricted her
freedom of choice. 5 ' However, in both Akron and Thornburgh, the
Court's pro-abortion majority went out of its way to reaffirm the princi-
ples of Roe and the validity of the trimester system. Both opinions in-
voked the doctrine of stare decisis. In Akron, Justice Powell recalled that
the "doctrine of stare decisis, while perhaps never entirely persuasive on
a constitutional question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a society
governed by the rule of law."52 The hospitalization requirement in Akron
and the determination of viability in Thornburgh best reflect the Court's
conflict and its direction.
A. Hospitalization Requirement
The Akron ordinance mentioned above required that all abortions af-
ter the first trimester be performed in a hospital setting. The Roe court
had listed a second trimester hospitalization requirement as an example
of a permissible state regulation of maternal health. However, delivering a
five-to-four majority opinion, Justice Powell found that the Akron legisla-
tion "places a significant obstacle in the path of women seeking an abor-
tion.""3 Not only were hospital abortions twice as expensive as clinical
abortions, but Akron hospitals also rarely terminated pregnancies in the
second trimester. According to the majority, this combination of in-
creased cost and restricted facilities "may significantly limit a woman's
ability tb ou~ain an abortion." '54
Justice Powell began his examination of the Akron legislation by re-
49 Id. at 322.
"O Id. at 324-26.
" Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented strongly and at length to all three
decisions. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 482-90 (1977).
52 Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 419-20 (1983).
Id. at 434.
5, Id. at 435.
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affirming the Roe framework. The "trimester standard . . .continues to
provide a reasonable legal framework for limiting a State's authority to
regulate abortions."" As noted above, the Roe doctrine considered that
the state's interest in protecting maternal health became compelling at
about the end of the first trimester. Thus, legislation requiring hospitali-
zation after the first twelve weeks of pregnancy could withstand constitu-
tional challenge provided it was reasonably related to maternal health
and in line with "accepted medical practice." The majority admitted that
the Akron provision would probably have been acceptable in 1973, when
second trimester abortions were more dangerous to maternal health than
childbirth. However, a decade later, the use of the dilation and evacua-
tion ("D&E") procedure had reversed the situation. D&E was always fa-
tal to the fetus, but it had increased the safety of second trimester abor-
tions dramatically for tht mother."
When D&E was used, medical evidence indicated that abortions were
as safe as childbirth for the early weeks of the second trimester. Of
greater concern for the Akron case, however, was that professional groups
such as the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists agreed
that some second trimester abortions could be performed as safely in an
outpatient abortion clinic as in a full service hospital. 7 The current medi-
cal evidence, then, would not justify a blanket hospitalization require-
ment for second trimester abortions. Thus, the Court concluded that the
Akron ordinance requiring that all such abortions be performed in a hos-
pital was not reasonably related to the state's interest in protecting ma-
ternal health. Instead, it "imposed a heavy, and unnecessary, burden on
women's access to a relatively inexpensive ...and safe abortion proce-
dure. . . . and therefore unreasonably infringe[d] upon a woman's con-
stitutional right to obtain an abortion." '58 In Simopoulos v. Virginia," a
companion case to Akron, the Court let stand a second trimester hospital-
ization provision very similar to the one invalidated in Akron. The crucial
difference was that the Virginia understanding of "hospital" included
outpatient clinics.6
B. Viability Concerns
The Roe Court held that the state has a compelling interest in regu-
lating post-viability abortions. The question then became: to what extent
can the state legislate the time of viability and regulate both the abortion
"' Id. at 429 n. 11.
" Id. at 435-37.
8' Id. at 437.
8 Id. at 438-39.
462 U.S. 506 (1983).
00 Id. at 510-19.
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procedure used by physicians and the standard of care given to viable
fetuses? Prior to Thornburgh, the Court's most detailed treatment of
these issues came in Colautti v. Franklin,61 decided in 1979. The Colautti
case involved a provision of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act men-
tioned earlier. Before performing an abortion, the Act required physicians
to use their best professional judgment to determine whether the fetus
was viable and to treat viable fetuses with the same medical care they
would give to those destined for normal birth. Physicians also had to use
the abortion procedure that offered the fetus the best chance of survival,
provided that it did not endanger the life or health of the mother.6 2
Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion for the Court. He invalidated
both the "viability-determination requirement" 63 and the "standard of
care provision" because they were "impermissibly vague. '6 4 The fatal flaw
in the Act's viability requirement was its failure to be specific as to how
viability was to be established. As written, the statute amounted to little
more than "a trap for those who act in good faith" and it could have a
"chilling effect" on physicians performing abortions near the time of via-
bility.65 The majority had similar difficulties with the Act's standard of
care. It was unclear to them whether the provision required a " 'trade-off'
between the woman's health and.., fetal survival.""6 In the Court's view,
the physician's primary concern always had to be maternal health rather
than fetal life.
The Thornburgh case involved a revised version of the Pennsylvania
Abortion Control Act struck down in Colautti. One provision of the Act
directed the physician to determine whether or not the fetus was viable;6
another banned post-viability abortions except when they were necessary
to protect the life or health of the mother.6 Like its earlier version, the
revised Act required physicians aborting viable fetuses to use a method
that would give the fetus the best chance of survival unless the procedure
would present a significantly greater risk to the life or health of the preg-
nant woman.69 Finally, when fetal survival was possible, the Act required
the presence of a second physician to provide medical care for the
aborted fetus. 0
' 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6605(a) (Purdon 1977) (§ 5(a) of the Pennsylvania Abortion Con-
trol Act).
11 Colauti, 439 U.S. at 390-97.
14 Id. at 391-96.
" Id. at 395-96.
" Id. at 400.
17 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3211(a) (1983).
88 Id. at § 3210(a).
09 Id. at § 3210(b).
0 Id. at § 3210(c).
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The Court invalidated the post-viability provisions, along with the
rest of the Abortion Control Act, on the general principle that the "States
are not free, under the guise of protecting maternal health or potential
life, to intimidate women into continuing pregnancies. 7 1 After specifi-
cally reaffirming the principles laid down in Roe, Justice Blackmun went
on to declare that the words "significantly greater" implied an unconsti-
tutional trade-off between maternal health and fetal life. The mother's
health must always be the "paramount consideration," and she must not
be forced "to bear an increased medical risk in order to save her viable
fetus.'"72
The Court also struck down the second-physician requirement. The
provision simply did not provide for emergency situations when a second-
physician may not be available. In Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas
City, Missouri, Inc. v. Ashcroft'7 the Court upheld a Missouri second-
physician statute similar to Pennsylvania's. However, the Ashcroft Court
found an "implied exception" to the law, when a second physician was
unavailable in emergencies. 7' The Thornburgh Court did not find such an
exception in the Pennsylvania legislation. In fact, the opposite was true.
Justice Blackmun charged that the legislature's "failure to provide a
medical-emergency exception . . .was intentional."5 Thus, the Court
concluded that the abortion regulation created an unacceptable danger to
the mother's life and health and was "chilling" to physicians performing
post-viability abortions. Since today's dissent can become tomorrow's ma-
jority opinion, a brief examination of the dissent to Roe and its offspring
will be helpful. 76
V. THE DISSENT
The dissenters in Roe and the subsequent pro-abortion decisions
have focused on two of Roe's primary features. First, the Roe opponents
have argued that there is no right to privacy in the Constitution that is
broad enough to embrace the woman's decision to terminate her preg-
nancy. Second, they have maintained that the choice of viability as the
time when the state can assert its interest in fetal life is arbitrary and
subject to developments in medical technology. The dissents of Justices
White and O'Connor go to the heart of the attacks on Roe and its
7' Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759
(1986).
" Id. at 769.
73 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
7' Id. at 485 n. 8.
71 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 771. (emphasis added).
7' Duncan, Justice O'Connor, The Constitution, and the Trimester Approach to Abortion:
A Liberty on a Collision Course With Itself, 29 CATH. LAW. 275, 278 (1984).
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progeny.
A. Justice White
Justice White dissented from the Roe decision because he could not
find a legitimate basis in the Constitution for a fundamental right to ter-
minate a pregnancy. Abortion did not meet the Constitutional criteria for
a fundamental right, i.e., it was neither implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, nor was it deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition.
Rather, the Court created the abortion right through an "exercise of raw
judicial power. '7 7 From Roe through Thornburgh, White has insisted that
abortion is a moral question that ought to be settled in the political
arena. The issue should be resolved by the will of the people, expressed
either through the legislative process or by the principles of their Consti-
tution. Since the Constitution does not address the abortion problem,
Justice White "would return the issue to the people by overruling Roe v.
Wade ,"'78
He also charged that the Roe trimester framework was not feasible.
"[T]he Court's choice of viability as the point at which the State's inter-
est [in fetal life] becomes compelling is entirely arbitrary."7 9 According to
Justice White, the government's concern for fetal life did not depend on
the capability of meaningful life outside the womb, nor was it "contingent
on the state of medical practice and technology." Rather, this interest
was inherent "in the fetus as an entity in itself" and was not activated at
viability but was equally compelling throughout the entire pregnancy."s
B. Justice O'Connor
In her lengthy and widely publicized dissent in Akron, Justice
O'Connor focused on three main points. First, she maintained that the
trimester approach was a "completely unworkable method" for reviewing
challenges to abortion legislation and should be abandoned.8 Second, she
argued that the potential for human life was extant through gestation. 2
Finally, she criticized the Court's constitutional standard for abortion
cases.
8 3
Justice O'Connor complained that the Roe trimester framework was
17 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221-22 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (expounding on Roe).
78 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 797 (White, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 794.
SO Id. at 794-95.
8' Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 453-59 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
12 Id. at 459-61 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Is Id. at 455-59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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"inherently tied to the state of medical technology." Consequently, courts
and legislatures had to stay abreast of the latest medical literature to be
certain that an abortion provision was in line with "accepted medical
practice" as to the safety of a given abortion and the time of viability. 4
Regarding the review of abortion legislation, then, the trimester approach
not only reduced the Court to an "ex officio medical board"8 5 but also
violated its primary function of applying neutral legal principles "'suffi-
ciently absolute to give them roots throughout the community and con-
tinuity over significant periods of time.' ""
Tied as it was to medical technology, Justice O'Connor considered
the trimester approach useless as a framework for balancing the state's
interest in both maternal health and fetal life. Medical advances would
probably make abortion safer for the mother than childbirth up to and
beyond viability. At the same time, different technological improvements
would push viability back to ever earlier stages of pregnancy. In fact, Jus-
tice O'Connor thought it was "reasonable to believe that fetal viability in
the first trimester of pregnancy may be possible in the not too distant
future."8 7 In her view, these conflicting medical advances created serious
problems for the Roe framework. Because abortion might become as safe
or safer than continuing the pregnancy to term, states could be prevented
from enacting restrictive abortion legislation designed to protect maternal
health. At the same time, Roe left the states free to regulate or even ban
abortion completely after viability. Because the Roe framework could not
resolve these conflicts, the trimester system was "clearly on a collision
course with itself."88 Thus, she would file the trimester approach away in
the same drawer with the flat earth theory and not appeal to the stare
decisis doctrine to justify its continued use.
She also rejected Roe's choice of viability as the time when the state's
interest in protecting the potential life of the unborn became compelling.
According to Justice O'Connor, Roe's understanding of "potential life"
was flawed. Potential life was just as potential in the first weeks of preg-
nancy as it was at viability or afterward. "At any stage in pregnancy,
there is the potential for human life."8' 9 Hence, the selection of viability
as the magic moment for validating the state's compelling interest in po-
tential life "is no less arbitrary than choosing any point before viability or
"' Id. at 455-59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 456 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 114 (1976)).
87 Id. at 457 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 461 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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any point afterward." 90 Accordingly, Justice O'Connor insisted that the
state has a legitimate concern in safeguarding potential life throughout
gestation.
The dismantling of the trimester system had important implications
for the constitutional standard applied in abortion decisions. In her dis-
sent in Thornburgh, Justice O'Connor accused the majority of being too
rigid in its scrutiny. To her, it was "painfully clear that no legal rule or
doctrine is safe from ad hoc nullification by this Court when an occasion
for its application arises in a case involving state regulation of abor-
tion." She proposed that abortion regulations be judged by the "unduly
burdensome" standard developed in Maher. If legislation does not impose
a hardship on a woman's abortion decision, it should be upheld provided
it meets the rational basis test. If the provisions involve "absolute obsta-
cles or severe limitations on the abortion decision," the strict scrutiny
standard of review must be applied. 2 In her dissent, Justice O'Connor
made it clear that she did not think it was an undue burden on a woman
seeking an abortion to require a twenty-four-hour waiting period, to re-
quire hospitalization for second-trimester abortions, or to require her to
have detailed information from her physician about fetal development
and abortion dangers.
In summary, Roe and its progeny attempted to balance the state's
legitimate interests in both maternal health and fetal life. In its judicial
review from Roe to Thornburgh, the Court never departed from its basic
conclusion in Roe that a woman has a constitutional right to terminate
her pregnancy. In fact, with the brief exception of the abortion funding
cases, the liberal wing of the Court constantly expanded the mother's
right to abortion and at the same time restricted the area where state
regulation could be exercised. Yet the mentality of the Court had begun
to change in Thornburgh. The solid seven-to-two Roe majority had dwin-
dled to a bare five-to-four margin in Thornburgh. The dissent had be-
come stronger and more focused. Moreover, on the eve of Webster v. Re-
productive Health Services, the makeup of the Court had changed even
more dramatically. Only four of the original Roe supporters remained on
the Court, while the other five justices had either publicly dissented from
Roe or were thought to be opposed to its reasoning. Thus, the Webster
case provided the Court with a real opportunity either to overrule Roe or
to modify it significantly.
90 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
91 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 814
(1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
"9 Akron, 462 U.S. at 463-64 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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VI. WEBSTER V. REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES9 3
The Webster case grew out of a 1986 Missouri law revised to update
existing statutes concerning abortion and the unborn. The preamble and
three other provisions of the statute reached the Court on appeal. The
preamble contained a "finding" by the legislature that the "life of each
human being begins at conception" and that "[u]nborn children have
protectable interests in life, health and well-being" at any stage of preg-
nancy. 4 Provisions barred public employees from performing or assisting
at abortions95 and banned the use of public facilities for abortions, even
when public funds were not involved. 6 The provision made exceptions
when the mother's life was threatened. The Act also made it unlawful to
use public funds for encouraging or counselling a mother to terminate her
pregnancy if her life was not endangered. 97 A final provision required
physicians to conduct certain tests to determine whether the fetus -was
viable if they had reason to believe that the woman seeking the abortion
was at least twenty weeks pregnant.99 Asserting violations of various
rights, an abortion clinic and a group of doctors brought a class action
suit against the statute.99
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a deeply divided Court, upheld
most of the Missouri provisions but stopped short of overruling Roe v.
Wade. The majority easily disposed of the Missouri preamble and the
ban against abortion counselling. Although the preamble was an impor-
tant symbol for both sides, Rehnquist ruled that it was not primarily an
abortion regulation but was essentially a "value judgment favoring child-
birth over abortion" that Missouri had a right to make. Since there was
no evidence that the provision had been or would ever be applied to re-
strict access to abortion, the Court did not have to decide its constitution-
ality.' 0 Chief Justice Rehnquist also dismissed the abortion-counselling
ban as moot. The provision was withdrawn from appeal when the state
conceded that it applied only to those persons responsible for allocating
public funds and not to the "conduct of any physician or health care pro-
vider, public or private."' 0 1 With these preliminaries taken care of, the
Chief Justice turned his attention to the two most controversial features
of the Webster case: the ban on abortions in public facilities and viability
3 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1990).
Id. § 188.210.
I d. § 188.215.
.7 Id. § 188.205.
98 Id.
11 Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3047.
100 Id. at 3050.
I", Id. at 3053.
FROM Roe TO Webster
testing.
A. Public Employees and Facilities
Rehnquist upheld the prohibition on the use of public employees and
public facilities for nontherapeutic abortions even when the patients
could pay for them. In his view, the Missouri policy raised issues similar
to those the Court decided in the abortion funding cases and in Poelker v.
Doe,"2 a companion case to Beal and Maher. In Poelker, the majority let
stand a St. Louis ordinance denying abortions at publicly operated city
hospitals on the ground that the city had a legitimate interest in encour-
aging childbirth.'0 3 Applying the Medicaid analysis in Webster, the Chief
Justice argued that "the State's decision here to use public facilities and
staff to encourage childbirth over abortion 'places no governmental obsta-
cle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy.' ",04
The Missouri regulations did not restrict the pregnant woman's abor-
tion options any more than if the state had chosen not to operate any
public hospitals at all. "The challenged provisions only restrict a woman's
ability to obtain an abortion to the extent that she chooses to use a physi-
cian affiliated with a public hospital."'10 5 The Missouri policy was merely a
logical extension of the Maher doctrine. If the state can favor childbirth
over abortion by denying public funds, surely it may do the same
"through the allocation of other public resources, such as hospitals and
medical staff."' 6
The Court also rejected the argument that Webster differed from
Maher because Missouri was expressing more than its preference for
childbirth over abortion. The regulation could actually make it very diffi-
cult for a woman to exercise her right to an abortion. Chief Justice Rehn-
quist brushed this charge aside, claiming that "[niothing in the Constitu-
tion requires States to enter or remain in the business of performing
abortions. Nor .. .do private physicians and their patients have some
kind of constitutional right of access to public facilities for the perform-
ance of abortions.'1 0 7
B. Viability Testing
The matter of viability testing was easily the most important and the
most controversial feature of the Webster decision. In addressing this
102 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
o Id. at 521.
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provision, the plurality seized the opportunity to attack the Roe frame-
work. According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the problem the Court faced
was not so much with the Missouri regulation as with the Roe analysis
itself. "We think that the doubt cast upon the Missouri statute..., is not
so much a flaw in the statute as it is a reflection of the ... rigid trimester
analysis ... ."'08 The Chief Justice went on to characterize the trimester
system as "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice."10 9 When
applied to subsequent abortion cases, it has made "constitutional law in
this area a virtual Procrustean bed." 110
The majority had problems with both the Roe trimester system and
its time of viability. Roe's rigid framework was simply inconsistent with
the general terms and broad principles contained in the Constitution. The
main features of the Roe decision could not be found either in the text of
the Constitution or in any other place one would expect to find a consti-
tutional principle. Consequently, Roe resembled "a code of regulations
rather than a body of constitutional doctrine."'' Furthermore, the time
of viability was confusing. Rehnquist could "not see why the State's inter-
est in protecting potential human life should come into existence only at
the point of viability, and that there should therefore be a rigid line al-
lowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting it before
viability. 11' 2
In the absence of the trimester framework, the Webster plurality
could uphold the constitutionality of viability testing because the state
"ha[d] chosen viability as the point at which its interest in potential
human life must be safeguarded."' 1 3 Chief Justice Rehnquist admitted
that the required tests would drive up the cost of abortions and regulate
the physician's direction in establishing viability. However, despite these
negative side affects, the Court was "satisfied that the requirement of
these tests permissibly further[ed] the State's interests in protecting po-
tential human life.""1
4
Despite dismantling the trimester structure, the Court declined to
overturn the Roe decision. That was unnecessary as Missouri did not at-
tempt to restrict abortions before viability Thus, the plurality was con-
tent to leave Roe "undisturbed," adding that they "would modify and
narrow" it in appropriate later cases." 5 While concurring with Rehnquist
"I' Id. at 3056.
1o9 Id.
110 Id.




"5 Id. at 3058.
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for the most part, Justices Scalia and O'Connor had separate and distinct
opinions on the matter of reversing Roe. Scalia thought that there were
'not only valid but compelling" reasons for attacking Roe directly." 6
Justice O'Connor, on the other hand, thought that "[w]hen the constitu-
tional invalidity of a State's abortion statute actually turns on the consti-
tutional validity of Roe v. Wade, there will be time enough to re-examine
Roe. And to do so carefully."'1 7
VII. CRITICAL REFLECTIONS
I mentioned earlier that the Webster decision met with mixed and
stormy public reviews. However, the Supreme Court itself also lost its
customary decorum and joined the fray. The rage and rhetoric that had
characterized the public debate on abortion prior to Webster crept into
the language of the decision. In a particularly bitter dissent, Justice
Blackmun blasted the majority for their brute force, cowardice, decep-
tion, disingenuousness, nonsense and illegitimacy." 8 The conservative
majority also bickered among themselves. Although they came down on
the same side of the case, Justice Scalia characterized Justice O'Connor's
position as "irrational""' 9 and declared that her reasons for not reconsid-
ering Roe "cannot be taken seriously.'1
20
Despite the rhetoric and slogans that accompanied it, Webster's im-
mediate impact was narrow. The decision did not affect private physi-
cians and facilities, where most abortions are actually performed. More-
over, since the testing provision applied only after viability, it did not
restrict the pregnant woman's access to an early abortion. Also, the ruling
did not have an immediate impact beyond Missouri since no other state
had abortion regulations identical to the ones upheld in Webster. How-
ever, the real importance of the decision lies, not in its specifics, but in
the implications it has for legislative activity and future abortion cases.
A. Legislative Activity
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that the majority opinion
issued an implicit invitation to every state to enact more restrictive abor-
tion laws, and to assert their interest in potential life as of the moment of
conception."' There is no doubt that the Webster decision "implicitly in-
vited" the states to present new challenges to Roe. Thus, the abortion
16 Id. at 3065 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
,7 Id. at 3061 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
Id. at 3067-79 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"9 Id. at 3066 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
120 Id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
"' Id. at 3067 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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battleground has shifted back to the state legislatures, where it had been
sixteen years ago when the Court preempted the abortion question with
its Roe decision. However, the present social climate on abortion is much
more volatile than it was when Roe was handed down. Now abortion has
become a central and controversial feature of the political landscape. As
partisans on both sides of the issue attempt either to enact more rigid
abortion regulations or to prevent the reversal of advantages won through
the courts, the legislative struggle will undoubtedly be protracted, bitter
and divisive.
The Webster decision did not spell out the scope and limits of what
the states could do in regulating abortion. However, given their first real-
istic chance in sixteen years to restrict the termination of pregnancies,
pro-life groups will press for more stringent laws than those upheld in
Webster. These will include many of the provisions the Court invalidated
since Roe, such as mandatory waiting periods, informed consent, parental
consent and notification for minors, and required hospitalization. Other
legislative possibilities include viability testing, banning of federal funds
and facilities and a more restricted definition of health than the Court set
forth in Doe v. Bolton.12
2
For their part, pro-choice strategists will mobilize to prevent the en-
actment of any state legislation infringing on the woman's freedom of
choice. Moreover, fearing a reversal of Roe, abortion advocates are likely
to concentrate on having a right to privacy enshrined in state constitu-
tions. A few states have taken that step already. Moreover, some activist
state courts have appealed to a state right to privacy to require the state
to fund nontherapeutic abortions. 12 For example, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court, in 1982, decreed that state law allowed women access to
abortion regardless of their ability to pay. 124
B. Future Abortion Cases
On the same day it handed down Webster, the Court decided to re-
solve some of the remaining issues by agreeing to hear three new abortion
cases in its fall term. 12 They all involve state regulations that can create
obstacles for pregnant women seeking abortions. Two of these cases con-
cern state laws mandating parental notification for all minors wanting to
terminate their pregnancies. The third requires clinics performing first
trimester abortions to meet medical standards similar to those demanded
122 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
123 Fein, The Court is Ready to Overturn "Roe," N.Y.Times, July 5, 1989, at A16.
114 Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925, 935 (1982).
,2' The three cases are: Turnock v. Ragsdale from Missouri; Ohio v. Akron Center for Re-
productive Health; and Hodgson v. Minnesota. See N.Y. Times, July 4, 1989, at A10.
FROM Roe TO Webster
of full-care hospitals. The outcome of these cases will depend on what
standard of review the Court chooses to apply.
When it was expanding the woman's right to terminate her preg-
nancy, the liberal wing of the Court applied the strict scrutiny standard
to strike down virtually every piece of abortion legislation it reviewed. In
the Webster decision, Justice Rehnquist introduced a new test: an abor-
tion regulation would be upheld if it "permissibly furthers the State's in-
terest in protecting potential human life."12 In his dissent, Justice Black-
mun found this "newly minted standard'! to be "circular and totally
meaningless." This "novel test" appeared to him "to be nothing more
than a dressed-up version of the rational-basis review, this Court's most
lenient level of scrutiny."'2 7 Justice O'Connor added to the confusion. She
opted for a middle ground, a standard more difficult than Chief Justice
Rehnquist's but less stringent than Justice Blackmun's. According to her,
abortion legislation would be valid as long as it did not "unduly burden"
a woman's abortion decision.'28 The justices' different standards of review
reflect their differences over whether abortion is truly a fundamental
right. On that issue, the Court is in disarray.2 9
As mentioned above, Justice White thought that abortion did not
meet the criteria for a fundamental right, i.e., it was neither "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty," nor was it "deeply rooted in the nation's
history and tradition.""' However, Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, in-
sisted that, at the very minimum, "a woman has a limited fundamental
constitutional right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy.""' In
contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist believed abortion was not "a liberty in-
terest protected by the due process clause.""' Although she has remained
silent on the matter, Justice O'Connor's willingness to apply the strict
scrutiny level of review to legislation that "unduly burdens" a woman's
abortion decision presupposes some kind of limited fundamental right to
terminate a pregnancy." 3
126 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3057.
1217 Id. at 3076 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
,28 Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
129 Commentary, A Thorn in the Side of Privacy: The Need for Reassessment of the Con-
stitutional Right to Abortion', 70 MARQ. L. REv. 534, 557 (1987). In these pages Kunz has a
thorough analysis of the disagreement within the Court over fundamental rights prior to
Webster. Cf. Shapiro, The Abortion Decision: A Threat to Liberties, Washington Post, July
9, 1989, at B4.
220 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 793
(1986) (White, J., dissenting).
"2, Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3076 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
12 Id. at 3058.
1"3 Akron, 462 U.S. at 453 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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In the Webster case, Chief Justice Rehnquist finessed the fundamen-
tal rights issue. He did not state explicitly that abortion was not a funda-
mental right. However, he argued that the Court's experience in applying
Roe to subsequent abortion cases convinced him "that there is wisdom in
not unnecessarily attempting to elaborate the abstract differences be-
tween a 'fundamental right' to abortion .... a 'limited fundamental con-
stitutional right,' . . . or a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause. ' 134 This is not the language of fundamental rights, that select cat-
egory of rights that can be regulated only if the state can prove a compel-
ling interest.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In its frequent review of legislation in the wake of its Roe decision,
the Court's abortion doctrine has reflected, more than anything else, its
liberal or conservative composition. When its liberal wing was the major-
ity, the Court broadened the right to terminate a pregnancy by curtailing
state regulation of the practice. The emergence of a conservative block
has moved the Court sharply to the right on the abortion question. With-
out actually overruling Roe, the Webster majority reversed the liberal
trend by allowing states to exercise some control over the woman's right
to terminate her pregnancy. However, as long as the Court's conservative
justices are unable to agree on the nature of the abortion right and the
appropriate standard for reviewing it, the extent of state regulation of
abortion and the future of abortion rights will remain problematic.
As in the past, the future direction of abortion will be determined by
the philosophical perspectives of the justices who apply the Constitution
to abortion legislation. Of the current Court, four liberal justices continue
to reaffirm the Roe conclusions, while four conservatives seem inclined to
overrule the decision. Justice O'Conner remains ambiguous. In both Ak-
ron and Thornburgh, she declined to address Roe directly because the
Court had not been asked to reexamine that decision. When asked in
Webster, she refused, stating that there would be time enough to do that
later. She continues to view the Roe trimester framework as "problem-
atic." However, her criticism of Roe in Webster was more muted than it
was in either Akron or Thornburgh. Perhaps, she does not relish the role
of being the swing vote for either upholding legalized abortion or for
striking it down. Consequently, given its current makeup, it is unlikely
that the Court will overrule the Roe decision during its fall session. In-
stead, it will probably be content to "modify and narrow" Roe by chip-
ping away at its edges.
"' Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3068.
